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IMPRISONMENT OF INDIGENTS FOR NONPAYMENT OF FINES
On September 30, 1968, Walter Strattman was found guilty in the
Hamilton County Municipal Court of making a false police report in vio-
lation of a Cincinnati ordinance.' He was sentenced to the maximum
term of six months in the Cincinnati Workhouse and given the maximum
fine of $500 and costs. His six month term expired on March 31, 1969,
but because of his indigency he was forced to begin working off the fine
at the rate of three dollars a day under the provisions of Section 2947.20
of the Ohio Revised Code.'
On April 19, 1969, he filed a petition for habeas corpus in the First
District Court of Appeals of Ohio, alleging denial of due process and
equal protection in violation of the fourteenth amendment. He also al-
leged that the Municipal Court had abused its discretion by sentencing
him to both the maximum term and maximum fine which would have to
be worked off by further imprisonment. The Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition, but the Ohio Supreme Court reversed3 and remanded the
case with instructions to allow the writ of habeas corpus.
The United States Supreme Court in Griffin v. Illinois,4 stated that
"[t~here can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends
on the amount of money he has." 5  The issue in the Strattman case was
whether Griffin should be extended to say there can be no equal justice
where the kind of punishment a man gets depends on the amount of money
he has. It is important to note at the outset that Strattman involved the im-
position of a sentence which, in effect, exceeded the maximum term of
imprisonment permitted by the substantive statute. This was due to the
I Cincinnati, Ohio, Code of Ordinances, § 901-f provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to report or cause to be re-
ported any felony or misdemeanor, or to give any information relating to such felony
or misdemeanor, to the division of police or to any member of said division, by tele-
phone, in writing or by any other communication, knowing that no such felony or
misdemeanor has in fact been committed. In shall further be unlawful for any person,
firm or corporation to give any information or report relating to any felony or misde-
meanor, which information or report is false, and which such person, firm or corpora-
tion knows to be false. Any violation of this section shall be punishable by a fine of
not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500.00) or by imprisonment for six (6) months
or both:'
2 OHIO REV. CODE § 2947.20 (Page 1953), provides:
"Where a fine may be imposed in whole or in part, in punishment of a misdemeanor,
including the violation of an ordinance of a municipal corporation and the judge or
magistrate has authority to order that the defendant stand committed to the jail of the
county or municipal corporation until the fine and costs are paid, the court may order
that such person stand committed to such jail or workhouse until such fine and costs
are paid or secured to be paid, or he is otherwise legally discharged. Persons so im-
prisoned shall receive credit upon such fine and costs, at the rate of three dollars per
day."
3 Strattman v. Studt, 20 Ohio St. 2d 95, 253 N.E2d 749 (1969).
4 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
5 Id. at 19.
fact that he had been given the maximum term of incarceration coupled
with the additional imprisonment forced upon him to work off the maxi-
mum fine. It is therefore necessary to distinguish this situation from
those involving a total term of incarceration below the maximum, or where
a fine is the only permissible sentence. Whether the distinction is relevant
to the issue of equality of punishment is doubtful, but the courts have
found it necessary to treat each of these situations separately due to the dif-
ferent complications they create in terms of the possible consequences to
our penal system. It should, however, be apparent that the Griffin ration-
ale is most easily applied to a case like Strattman, where the maximum
fine forces the indigent to serve a term in addition to the authorized maxi-
mum.
Whether Griffin should be extended at least that far has been the
issue in several recent cases. In 1965, the Orange County Court of New
York, in the case of People v. Collins,6 held that equal protection was
violated when an indigent, who had been given the maximum sentence on
an assault charge, was also forced to work off a $250 fine at one dollar a
day.
To hold otherwise would add one more disadvantage which the law will
place upon the indigent defendant, and one more advantage which the law
will give to the defendant with the money in his pocket to pay his fine,
although the quality of their conduct has been the same and although their
intention to pay the fine has been the same.7
In a similar case, the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Saffore,8
held that if a court adds to the maximum sentence a fine which the court
knows cannot be paid ". . . imprisonment to work out the fine, if it results
in a total imprisonment of more than a year for a misdemeanor ... violates
the defendant's right to equal protection of the law. . ...
In the more recent case of Sawyer v. District of Columbia,'0 the D.C.
Court of Appeals held that a judge cannot impose a fine on an indigent
that results in a prison term which exceeds the maximum allowed by the
substantive statute. That case is not based on constitutional grounds, but
rather on the theory that a judge abuses his discretion when he imposes
a longer term of punishment than is permitted by law."'1  The court
in Sawyer was able to avoid the equal protection issue by holding that the
legislature had not intended the non-payment statute to be used against in-
digents.1" The court however, recognized that if the statute could be used
647 Mis. 2d 210, 261 N.Y.S.2d 970 (1965).
7 Id. at 213, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 973.
8 18 N.Y.2d 101, 218 N.E.2d 686, 271 N.Y.S.2d 972 (1966).
9Id. at 105, 218 N.Y.2d at 668, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 975.
10 238 A.2d 314 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
1 Id. at 318.
12 Id.
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against indigents, it "would then present the grave constitutional ques-
tions"'13 of equal protection.
In 1969, however, in the case of People v. Williams,14 an indigent
was convicted of theft and sentenced to the maximum term of one year
and the maximum fine of $500 which he would have to work off at five
dollars a day. The Illinois Supreme Court held that there was no equal
protection violation, and based its decision on the following statement
taken from a 1965 New York District Court case.' 5
No different conclusion is required by the line of cases beginning with
Griffin v. People of State of Illinois. Those decisions making review of
criminal convictions available to the indigent have not yet been construed
to compel government, State or Federal, to eradicate from the adminis-
tration of criminal justice every disadvantage caused by indigence.16
The court in Williams then went on to distinguish Saffore and Sawyer
on the ground that they had interpreted their nonpayment statutes to be
applicable only to those defendants who were able but unwilling to pay.' 7
The Illinois statute however, had been interpreted in the past' as apply-
ing also to willing indigents who were unable to pay.
Thus, Illinois decided that Griffin should not be extended beyond the
trial and appellate areas of the law.'9 The Ohio Supreme Court faced
the same question in Strattman. The only other Ohio case dealing with
the subject was In Re Cole,2" which was decided by the Cuyahoga County
Court of Appeals in 1968. In that case the indigent had already served
the maximum sentence and was working off a $1,200 fine at three dollars
a day. In a very brief opinion, the court expressly declined to consider
the equal protection issue, but demanded the indigent's immediate release
on the theory that the Sawyer rationale controlled, and that the court below
had, therefore, abused its discretion.
In view of these cases the first problem which confronted the court in
Strattman was whether the legislature intended the nonpayment statute to
apply to indigents. As the Williams case pointed out, the courts in Sawyer
and Saffore had interpreted similar statutes as applying only to able, but
unwilling defendants. In other words, the statute had the sole purpose of
coercing payment, and thus could not be used against a willing indigent
who could not pay no matter how great the coercion. Had the Ohio Su-
13 Id.
1441 Ill.2d 511, 244 N.E. 197 (1969).
15U.S. ex. rel. Privitera v. Kross, 239 F. Supp. 118 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), affPd, 345 F.2d 533
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 911 (1965).
16 239 F. Supp. at 120-21.
17 People v. Williams, 41 111. 2d 511,244 N.E. 197, 199 (1969).
18 People v. Jaraslowski, 254 Ill. 299,98 N.E. 547 (1912).
19 See generally, 64 M I-. L. RBv. 938-47 (1966).
2017 Ohio App.2d 207, 245 N.E.2d 384 (1968).
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preme Court interpreted Section 2947.20 in this manner, the constitutional
issues could have been avoided, but instead the court attributed a dual pur-
pose to the statute. Besides its coercive qualities, the statute had the "...
additional objective of giving the state a method of obtaining payment of a
fine from one who is unable to pay."21  Superficially, this interpretation
was based both on the common-law method of collecting fines and also on
language contained in Section 2947.15. That statute provides that a per-
son imprisoned for nonpayment of fines "shall perform labor.""2  More
importantly, however, the court bases its dual purpose interpretation on the
assertion that the single-purpose concept would ". . . lead to a result which
denies equal protection to one who can pay, while the indigent goes un-
punished ' 23 if the substantive statute fails to prescribe any confinement.
Although the offense for which Strattman was convicted did provide for
confinement, it is important to note that the only issue at this point in the
opinion is the legislative intent. The court was unwilling to ascribe to the
legislature the unconstitutional purpose which would arise out of the
single-purpose concept in a situation where a fine was the only permissible
punishment. Obviously the legislature could not have intended to let a
defendant escape punishment altogether, and therefore, they must have in-
tended the statute to perform a dual purpose.
Since the Ohio statute has a dual purpose the defendant in Strattman
loses his argument that the court abused its discretion by applying it to him.
However, the court never faces the problem of whether it still might be an
abuse of discretion to use even a dual-purpose statute to confine an indigent
for a period in excess of the permissible maximum. In other words, there
may be two possible abuses. In a single-purpose jurisdiction, Saffore im-
plies that the judge cannot apply the nonpayment statute to an indigent
even though the total term will be far below the maximum, for the simple
reason that the legislature never intended it to apply to him.24 The Sawyer
case, however, seems to imply that even in a dual-purpose jurisdiction, the
court cannot utilize the statute in the case of an indigent if it will result in
a total term of incarceration which exceeds the maximum allowed, for the
reason that it imposes ".. . a longer term of punishment than is permitted
by law."25  The court in Strattman fails to meet this problem by simply
stating that the latter theory arises out of the single-purpose concept.2 6
Having determined the purpose of Section 2947.20, the court next con-
fronted the issue of whether that purpose was constitutionally permissible.
More precisely, can the amount of punishment a defendant receives de-
21 Strattman v. Smt, 20 Ohio St.2d 95, 99, 253 N.E.2d 749, 752 (1969).
221 d. at 101, 253 N.E.2d at 753.
23 Id. at 100, 253 N.E.2d at 752.
2 4 People v. Saffore, 18 N.Y.2d 101, 218 N.E.2d 686, 687, 271 N.Y.S.2d 972, 973 (1966).
2 5 Sawyer v. District of Columbia, 238 A.2d 314, 318 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
2 0 Strartman v. Studt 20 Ohio St2d 95, 100, 253 N.X.2d 749, 752 (1969).
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pend upon his solvency? The court, after recognizing that a Griffin-type
discrimination is before them, states:
We hold that Section 2947.20, Revised Code, as applied to an indigent
defendant who has served the maximum incarceration authorized by the
substantive statute, violates the equal protection guarantee of the Four-
teenth Amendment... 32
At first glance, it appears that the Ohio Supreme Court has fallen in
line with the Collins rationale by extending Griffin to the situation where
the maximum sentence has been exceeded. The court begins its discussion
by pointing out that a solvent defendant has a choice of either paying the
fine or spending extra time in jail. "The indigent, however, has no
choice."28  That statement seems to be leading to the logical conclusion
that Griffin has been violated since the indigent, because of his indigency,
has no choice and is automatically given a longer jail term than the solvent
defendant. That anticipated conclusion, however, does not materialize.
Instead the court continued with the following:
Because of that inability, a law which requires an indigent to work off a
fine, must reasonably equate the amount of work required and the dollar
amount of the fine so as not to offend our legal tradition of fundamental
faimess.29
Thus, Strattman holds that the lack of choice does not violate equal
protection, but it does say that because the indigent has no choice, he must
be given a punishment which more closely resembles the harshness of a
fine. This can be accomplished by raising the daily amount credited to the
indigent, thus decreasing the number of days he will have to spend in
jail working off the fine. The problem of how much of an increase in
the per diem rate is required to accomplish this equality of punishment is
expressly left to the legislature3 0 The Ohio Supreme Court seems to have
borrowed this theory from the following statement in Collins:
It is only if we equate the payment of the fine with the additional period
of detention in prison that both men can be said to stand equal before the
law. An equation of one day of a man's liberty in jail for every one dollar
of the fine, in this enlightened era, should be examined very carefully be-
fore this form of equality of treatment is endorsed. 3'
Collins, however, talks in terms of equal protection while Strattman
speaks of "fundamental fairness.132 This apparent inconsistency can be
explained by a reference to Judge Taft's concurring opinion. He feels
27 Id. at 99, 253 N.E.2d at 752.
28 Id. at 101, 253, N.E.2d at 753.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 102, 253 N.E.2d at 754.
3147 Misc. 2d 210, 212, 261 N.Y.S.2d 970, 973 (1965).
32 Strattman v. Studt, 20 Ohio St.2d 95, 101, 253 N.E2d 749, 754 (1969).
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that the due process clause should be used in this case rather than the
Griffin rationale:
If the state takes property from its owner and pays him an inadequate
amount of compensation therefor, it is obvious that the state thereby de-
prives the owner of his property without due process of law. Likewise,
... if the state takes the liberty of the person convicted and fined in or-
der to collect its fine, in making an inadequate allowance for that liberty,
it thereby deprives that person of his liberty without due process of law.3a
The majority, however, uses this theory only as an alternative in addi-
tion to the equal protection argument. Strattman, like Collins, is based
primarily on equal protection since it has required that equality of punish-
ment be accomplished via a higher per diem rate. It is important to note
that not only will this solution affect the cases where the total term of
imprisonment exceeds the maximum, but also where it is below the maxi-
mum and even in the situation where the statute only provides for a fine.
In other words, the court has decided that Griffin should be extended to
the area of fines, and it therefore requires that some attempt be made to
equalize the amount of punishment in all cases. Perhaps the court has de-
clared that the higher per diem rate will accomplish this objective in every
case, however, the opinion seems to indicate that there may be some situa-
tions where equalization is not possible. At any rate the following state-
ment furnishes the basis for arguing that proposition:
In today's society, no one, in good conscience, can contend that a nine-
dollar fine for crashing a stop sign is deserving of three days in jail if one
is unable to pay. The effect of Section 2947.20, when applied to the indi-
gent, denies him equal protection and punishes him much more severely
merely because he is unable to pay. (emphasis added).34
Before analyzing that statement, it should be recalled that "In]ot every
discrimination is invalid"3 5 and "... . legislation may impose special bur-
dens upon defined classes in order to achieve permissible ends." 38  The
Federal District Court of Maryland has recently stated:
The commitment of convicted defendants who default in the payment of
their fines, whether from inability or unwillingness to pay, imposes a bur-
den upon a defined class to achieve a permissible end in which the state
has a vital interest, i.e., that persons who are found guilty of breaking the
laws shall receive some appropriate punishment to impress on the offender
the importance of observing the law, in the hope of reforming him, and
to deter the offender and other potential offenders ... in the future.3T
Since Strattman has extended Griffin to the area of fines, perhaps the
3d. at 104, 253 N.E.2d at 755.
341d. at 101-02, 253 N.E.2d 753.
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issue in future cases will be whether the amount of punishment given in a
particular situation is so unfair and unequal that it outweighs the corre-
sponding state interest. Thus, in Strattman, the court decides that the
combination of the maximum sentence, and the maximum fine plus the
"unreasonable" sum of three dollars a day, when applied to the indigent
". .. denies him equal protection and punishes him much more severely
merely because he is unable to pay."' 8 (emphasis added). This language
may indicate that even after the legislature raises the per diem rate to a
"reasonable"39 amount an indigent might be able to claim that he has been
denied equal protection if he can show that his punishment is "much more
severe" than a solvent defendant receives. For example, would the com-
bination of the maximum jail term plus the maximum fine violate an
indigent's equal protection rights since his total sentence would well exceed
the amount permitted by law? The court in Strattman never answered
that question since it was unnecessary to do so. This is because both of the
above mentioned factors were present plus the unreasonable per diem
rate of three dollars a day. It is interesting to note that the syllabus states
the following:
A court sentence pursuant to law which imposes both a maximum confine-
ment and a fine does not, standing alone, deny an indigent equal protec-
tion of the laws.40
Perhaps the omission of the word "maximum" before the word "fine"
was merely an oversight. On the other hand, it may indicate that a maxi-
mum fine would cause the indigent's sentence to exceed the maximum per-
missible term by so much that he is punished much more severely than a
solvent defendant. In fact any fine, even less than the maximum, which
exceeds the term permitted by law by an unreasonable number of days,
may be held to punish the indigent much more severely.
This may explain why Judge Taft would prefer to base the decision on
due process grounds. His objection to the majority's reasoning is stated
as follows:
However, if the equal protection reasoning of . . .[Griffin] is used
as the basis for preventing confinement under Section 2947.20, Revised
Code, of only those who are indigent, then confinement thereunder of a
defendant who is not indigent will necessarily deny him protection of the
laws equal to that given an indigent defendant.41
He speaks about using Griffin to prevent confinement, but the major-
ity has not used Griffin to prevent imprisonment of indigents under
2947.20. The court merely required that some attempt be made to equalize
the punishment by raising the per diem rate. Perhaps Taft fears that
U Strattman v. Studt, 20 Ohio St. 2d 95, 102, 253 N.E.2d 749, 753 (1969).
39 Id. at 103, 253 N..2d at 754.
40 Id. at 95, 253 N.E.2d at 250.
41Id. at 104, 253 N.E.2d 755.
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Griffin may be used to prevent confinement in future cases involving the
situations mentioned above where the indigent is punished much more
severely, and under his due process reasoning that would not occur.
The cases mentioned earlier, which extended Griffin to the area of
fines have all gone further than Strattman in determining when the pun-
ishment becomes so unequal as to outweigh the countervailing state interest.
In three of those cases, the statute was interpreted as being based on the
single-purpose concept. Thus Sawyer, although not based on constitutional
grounds, did recognize that equal protection problems were involved, and
set the limits of the judge's discretion at the maximum term "in every
case"'2 whether the judge was aware of the defendant's indigency or not.
Saffore seems to go even further than that insofar as the state statute's
intent is concerned.
Since imprisonment for nonpayment of a fine can validly be used only as
a method of collection for refusal to pay a fine we should now hold that
it is illegal so to imprison a defendant who is financially unable to pay.43
This language implies that the state statute may never be used against an
indigent even if the total term would be less than the maximum. Saffore,
however, is also based on constitutional grounds, which would set the new
limit if the New York legislature decided that it wanted a dual-purpose
statute. In that event, Saffore holds that equal protection draws the line
at one year for a misdemeanor, if the judge knows that the defendant is
indigent.44
Collins also involves a single-purpose statute, but rests its holding
solely on equal protection grounds. That case holds that the cut off
point is reached when the indigent is given a maximum jail term plus a
fine (not necessarily the maximum fine) which results in incarceration
beyond the permissible maximum.45
The only two cases, other than Strattman, which involved dual-purpose
statutes are Williams" and Morris v. Schoonfield.4 7 As mentioned above,
Williams refused to extend Griffin to the area of fines at all. But in
42 Sawyer v. District of Columbia, 238 A.2d 314,318 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
"We hold this sentence invalid, and are of the opinion that in every case in which the
defendant is indigent, a sentence of imprisonment in default of payment of a fine
which exceeds the maximum term of imprisonment which could be imposed under the
substantive statute as an original sentence is an invalid exercise of the court's discre-
tion for the reason that its only conceivable purpose is to impose a longer term of
punishment than is permitted by law."
4 3 People v. Saffore, 18 N.Y.2d 101, 218 N.E.2d 686, 687, 271 N.Y.S.2d 974 (1966).
44 The court states:
'"We do hold that, when payment of a fine is impossible and known by the court to be
impossible, imprisonment to work out the fine, if it results in a total imprisonment
of more than a year for a misdemeanor,... violates the defendant's right to equal pro-
tection...." Id. at 104, 218 N.E.2d at 688, 271 N.Y.S. 2d at 975.
45 People v. Collins, 47 Misc.2d 210, 213, 261 N.Y.S.2d 970, 973-74 (1965).
4 0 People v. Williams, 41 Ill.2d 511, 244 N.E. 197, 199 (1969).
4T 301 F. Supp. 159, 163 (D.C. Md. 1969).
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Morris, the Federal District Court of Maryland, held that even in the
case where the total term of imprisonment is far below the maximum al-
lowed, the statute cannot be constitutionally applied ".... unless [the de-
fendant] is given an opportunity to tell the judge that he is financially
unable to pay the fine before he is committed for nonpayment ... .
Under this approach, the judge can then allow the defendant to pay the
fine on the installment plan, or the judge will proportionately lower the
fine, thus reducing the number of days he will have to serve for nonpay-
ment. Under this latter system the judge will presumably try to translate
the amount of the fine into terms of days in jail. For example, if the fine
would be $60 for a solvent defendant, and the per diem rate for indigents
is two dollars, the judge would probably lower the fine to $10 so that the
indigent would only have to spend five extra days in jail instead of thirty
at two dollars a day.
It is interesting to note that Strattman accomplishes approximately the
same result without involving the judge in any way. Thus if the Ohio
legislature raises the per diem rate to twelve dollars a day, an indigent
under the example above would have to spend five extra days in jail in-
stead of twenty at three dollars a day. Strattman, however, avoids the
administrative and enforcement problems which would arise out of Morris'
alternative of installment payments. Strattman, however, can only work
if the courts do not arbitrarily raise the amount of the fines they give to
indigents. If, however, a court does give an unreasonably high fine in a
particular set of circumstances, the appellate court could reverse, or modify
the fine on the theory that it was an abuse of discretion to use even a dual-
purpose statute in that manner.
It will be interesting in the future to see if the Griffin rationale will
be extended even further in Ohio. For the moment, however, both Stratt-
man and Morris represent significant advances with little or no adverse
effect on our penal system. Even though they do not go as far as some of
the other cases which prohibit confinement after a certain point is reached,
both Strattman and Morris are unique in that they provide solutions which
benefit a/ indigents who must work off fines, instead of just those who
are punished "much more severely." This, of course, represents an impor-
tant and equitable change in our penal system.49
James 1. Erb
48 The court states:
"The judge may then tailor the fine to the situation of the particular defendant, by al-
lowing him to pay the fine in installments or by reducing the fine, thereby reducing
the period the defendant will have to serve in lieu of paying the fine." Id.
49 The court also held that Section 2947.20 could not be used to confine a defendant to
work off court costs since they represent a civil debt. The Ohio Constitution provides in
Article I § 15:
"No person shall be imprisoned for debt in any civil action, on mense or final proc-
ess, unless in cases of fraud."
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